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An industry structured for unsafety? An exploration of the cost-safety 
conundrum in construction project delivery 
 
 
Construction accidents can have major social, financial, reputational and legal implications. Hence, it 
is to be expected that safety is often presented as a key priority for construction organisations. However, 
existing evidence suggests that within the construction industry, safety often loses the battle when a 
trade-off is required with project cost. Improved understanding of the manifestations of the cost and 
safety interaction are needed. A three-year longitudinal study afforded the opportunity to investigate 
the safety implications of sub-economic bids on a large infrastructure project in the UK. While low-
bidding to win tenders is not new, this paper presents empirical evidence of the consequential safety 
risk implications of such bidding at the project delivery stage. Faced with a perverse form of the tender 
‘Winner’s Curse’ where the successful bid is frequently the lowest, cost-saving strategies are often 
implemented to recoup lost pricing margins. Our investigation revealed several instances of 
consequentially elevated safety risks, through cheaper and poor-quality equipment, machinery and 
temporary structures. In addition, lower-paid migrant workers – who already experience a statistically 
greater safety risk than local workers – were employed on the project without appropriate investment 
in a safety management approach suitable for a multinational workforce. The study both contributes to 
the call to critically rethink the construction industry’s competitive bidding practices, and highlights an 
industry structure that creates the conditions for high safety risks and accidents. 
 




The Health and Safety (H&S) manager returned to the department office from a senior executive 
meeting. He wandered towards his desk, muttering words that were often heard in the office: ‘cost, cost, 
cost, programme, programme, and programme.’ One of the four H&S advisors present in the office 
joked: ‘The power of pound. The pound is king.’ The H&S manager stopped, and turned to the advisor: 
‘Oh they are all for having ‘stop the drops’ campaign; but as soon as you raise the cost of tool tethers… 
there is a frosty reception.’ The construction manager joined the conversation: ‘what do you 
expect…they want us to complete the job, under cost, under schedule, and under resourced.'  
 
The H&S team were in a support role on this project.  Consequently, they could advise, but in most 
situations could not take pro-active action. However, they were not the only ones left frustrated at the 
imbalance between cost and safety, as the site management teams also had the challenge of managing 
cost pressures. One of the experienced H&S advisors went beyond the project, using a car analogy to 
describe the industry challenges faced: 'Until the UK construction industry changes, and doesn’t shave 
you down pound by pound, you won’t get the Range Rover product that consists of adequate 
supervision, best practice, the right equipment and going above and beyond the standards. Only then 
you get the product you want... with it being delivered safely – but that comes with a cost. We’ve got 





The total costs of fatal and nonfatal injuries in the construction industry have been estimated as being a 
disproportionately high US$11.5 billion when compared to other industries (Waehrer et al., 2007). 
These figures affect insurance costs, and also raise concerns around appropriate investment in accident 
prevention. This is arguably a very difficult question to answer considering construction site accidents 
are multi-causal events within complex socio-technical situations, rather than having a direct cause-
effect relationship (Harvey et al., 2018). This complexity extends beyond accidents, as costs figures can 
be influenced by external social influences. For instance, in the US construction industry, Everett & 
Frank (1996:158) explained that the cost of workers' compensation insurance has skyrocketed, with 
there being ‘a rash of third-party lawsuits as a result of accidents on construction sites’; and in the UK, 
Oswald et al. (2018a) revealed that fraudulent construction accident claims were seen as socially 
acceptable within some construction workgroups.  
 
Despite these complexities, many researchers have attempted to estimate safety costs in construction, 
not least because the safety budget for construction projects has been identified as a factor that is related 
to the average number of accidents (López-Alonso et al., 2013). Within the construction industry, safety 
costs for construction processes are typically covered under the general expenses item of the 
construction site (Akcay et al., 2018). Feng (2013) found that the levels of investment have varying 
levels of effectiveness depending on the safety culture level and project hazard level, whilst Akcay et 
al. (2018) suggested that safety costs could be estimated based on the size of the actual construction 
work areas in the projects.  
 
In terms of accident prevention, Pellicer et al. (2014) found that H&S costs for a case study construction 
project (which included insurance, prevention and accident costs) came to approximately 5% of the 
total cost of the project, which is about three times the average investment actually made for prevention. 
Ikpe et al. (2012) similarly found that accident prevention costs outweigh the cost of an accident by a 
ratio of approximately 3:1. While this perhaps suggests that more financial investment should occur 
within the industry, it is important to note that models proposed to estimate the costs and benefits of 
preventive measures are complex, as indirect costs can be hidden, hard to single out, identify, estimate 
and evaluate (Jallon et al., 2011). Previous research has tended to focus on such cost-benefit analysis 
for accident prevention in quantitative terms. Yet, how these accident prevention costs can be spent 
effectively, especially within the tight construction budgets the industry structure demands, is less well 
explored. This paper reveals empirical insights around H&S prevention costs to help close this gap in 
knowledge. 
 
The wider construction industry structure also influences actions that occur at the project level. Hopkins 
(2019) explained how decentralised organisational structures (as typically found in the construction 
industry) allow for profit and production to take precedence over safety. The ethnographic prologue at 
the start of this article, including the statement “they want us to complete the job, under cost, under 
schedule, and under resourced” was a common theme in the findings of the research study presented 
here, and aptly sums up the focus of this paper. This prologue was extracted from a field note captured 
by the lead author on a major construction project (+ £500m) in the UK, with over 1000 inducted 
employees. The project had been awarded to a consortium with a winning bid that was approximately 
£250m less than the next nearest competitor. This paper therefore also acknowledges the lowest-cost 
tendering strategies, commonplace across the industry as a whole, and reveals the consequences of these 
practices and how they manifest as critical precursors for poor safety practices during project delivery.  
The overall aim of this paper is therefore to both investigate, illuminate and reveal the practical safety 
implications of sub-economic bids on a large infrastructure case-study project, and better inform how 
accident prevention costs can be spent most effectively within tight construction budgets, drawing on 
empirical data gathered through a three-year ethnographic approach.  This work is able to make a 
contribution to knowledge by revealing how the cost-safety conundrum is realised in practice, adding 
another facet of nuance and insight to the existing quantitative knowledge in this space. 
 
2.1 Safety costs 
 
Lopez-Alonso et al. (2016:625) define safety costs on building sites as: ‘the cost of the resources, goods 
and services employed in order to improve working conditions and to reduce the accident rate, together 
with those generated by the occurrence of incidents and/or accidents.’ These include ‘safety costs’, 
which are the resource costs needed to implement preventive actions that are either voluntarily or under 
legal obligation; and ‘non-safety costs’, which are tangible, intangible and extraordinary costs 
associated with not meeting safety standards. Extraordinary costs cover all the losses on building sites 
caused by events beyond the control of technical or human management. 
 
From a contractor’s perspective, estimating the true costs associated with completing a construction 
project, and the eventual price offered to the client in a bid, can be a complex exercise. Bids need to 
factor in cost estimations to achieve various project goals; including completing the work in the required 
time, to the expected quality, and to not harm anyone during the process. Indeed, safety can represent a 
significant cost to employers (Finkel, 2015). Fellows et al. (2002) explained that safety costs can be 
categorised into two groups: costs associated with work accidents and accident prevention costs.  
 
2.1.1 Costs associated with work accidents 
 
Costs associated with work accidents can be direct or indirect. Direct costs are visible and obvious costs 
such as insurance premiums (Brody et al., 1990). Indirect cost resulting from work accidents are costs 
that are ‘absorbed entirely by the employer and which are usually not attributed to the specific accident, 
to overall accidents or which simply never enter the accounting system’ (Brody et al., 1990:260). In 
terms of accident costs, Feng et al. (2015) found the average direct and indirect accident costs were only 
0.165%, and 0.086% of contract sum, suggesting direct costs are approximately double those of indirect. 
However, Haupt & Pillay (2016) found an opposing result with indirect costs being approximately twice 
that of direct costs. Sawacha et al. (1999) proposed that for every £1 of an accident cost paid by an 
insurance company, the contractor could expect to pay between £5 to £50 in indirect costs; and 
SafeWork Australia (2015) estimated that 25 per cent of the total costs are due to the direct costs of 
work-related incidents, with the other 75 per cent are accounted for by indirect costs such as lost 
productivity, social costs and legal fees. The range of conflicting figures emerging from the literature 
highlights the challenges in measuring direct and indirect accident costs.  
 
2.1.2 Accident prevention costs 
 
Accident prevention costs can be classified as compulsory or voluntary. Compulsory costs accrue from 
the minimum safety protection measures that are legally required, and which involve staff training, 
equipment and facilities (Akcay et al., 2018). Voluntary investments are costs that are not driven solely 
by legal requirements and can include safety initiatives, safety promotions, incentives, new 
technologies, and methods or tools designed for safety (Feng, 2013). Accident prevention costs can be 
further classified into three groups (Brody et al., 1990):  
 fixed prevention: costs typically being incurred on plant and equipment before production 
begins and exist regardless of the accident rate. 
 variable prevention: costs proportional to accident frequency rates and their severity. They 
are linked to the time taken for accident analysis, cause identification and implementation of 
corrective measures. 
 unexpected prevention: costs initially unforeseen such as an equipment modification to lower 
noise levels, or changes in legislative requirements or cultural norms. 
 
The amount of financial investment in prevention costs is linked to the overall budget of the project. 
López-Alonso et al. (2013) analysed 40 projects while they were in progress and reported three 
observations (the third particularly relevant for accident prevention costs): 
 the number of accidents on the projects display a positive relationship with the total number 
of workers.  
 the number of accidents on the projects also display a positive relationship with the average 
number of subcontractors. And finally,  
 the number of accidents on the projects are inversely associated with the cost of accident 
prevention. 
 
This relationship is important. While there are several possible reasons for accident causation on 
construction projects, some of which are beyond the control of workers and management, the 
implication of the third observation by López-Alonso et al. (2013) may indicate that time and capital 
investment in accident prevention programs are able to reduce the incidents of accidents and injuries.  
 
2.2 The cost-safety trade-off  
 
The concept of precursors is helpful for explicating the context and nature of safety incidents and 
accidents in work environments. As explored by Smith et al (2017), precursors (or antecedents) are the 
conditions or acts that precede and lead-up to unsafe behaviours and accidents. This concept assumes 
that unsafe practices and incidents are usually symptoms that point to deeper, underlying precursors. 
Precursors are thus the “building blocks” of unsafe practices, and can include events both internal to an 
organization (such as resourcing, training, culture, equipment failures and human errors) and external 
(such as adverse weather events).  
 
Love et al. (2018) extend the motif of precursors to identify three clusters of underlying sources of 
safety incidents – people, organisation and project. The focus on people, evidenced through risky 
behaviour, skills, knowledge, localisation of control and influence from management, is thoroughly 
explored in the extant literature (e.g. Fang et al. 2015; Loosemore & Lam 2004; Ng et al. 2005). The 
contributions of the organisation through its safety culture, incidence reporting, procedures, training 
programmes and incentive structure have also been explored in some detail (e.g. Fung et al. 2016; 
Lingard et al. 2015; Love et al. 2016). The third construct identified by Love et al (Love et al. 2018) is 
at the project perspective – for example, the nature and type of task, schedule pressure. Included in the 
project category is the level and type of resource made available to complete the task – equipment, 
tools, training and induction, size of the project, etc. (Holt 2016; Manu et al. 2014). These usually have 
direct cost implications for completing the construction project (López-Alonso et al. 2013). Provisions 
for safety and the available project budget have a logical relationship - tight project budgets can lead to 
cost-safety trade-offs that prioritise getting the job at the lowest cost possible, inducing production 
pressures known to cause accidents.  
 
While the conceptual clusters of people, organisation and project presented by Love et al (2018) are 
helpful for understanding some of the underlying precursors to safety incidents in construction delivery, 
a fourth dimension could include the economics of construction business as dictated by the wider 
industry structure and its practices.  Indeed, cost-safety trade-offs during construction delivery are often 
exacerbated by an industry structure characterised by high competition, low barriers of entry, low profit 
margins as well as the use of competitive tendering in the construction industry (Ahiaga-Dagbui & 
Smith 2014; Love et al. 2012).  
 
Competitive tendering is the predominant procurement approach within the construction industry, 
particularly for publicly funded projects (Coggins et al. 2016; Gerber & Ong 2013; Ioannou & Awwad 
2010). For clients, this is useful for maximizing the benefits of competition in terms of innovation, value 
and cost, while pursuing fairness and accountability in capital spending. While clients may select their 
preferred contractors based on best value frameworks, the most economically-advantageous tender, or 
even non-price features like innovation, experience and past performance, Chaovalitwongse et al. 
(2012) observed that the predominant approach adopted by clients is based on a ‘lowest price policy’ – 
the lowest bidder wins the contract. This is well-documented and supported in the construction literature 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015; Coggins et al. 2016; Gerber & Ong 2013; Oviedo-Haito et al. 2014). 
While competitive tendering may hold several benefits for clients in terms of bargaining power, it 
equally presents some commercial challenges to contractors, especially in a heavily oversupplied 
market such as the construction industry.  
 
There is evidence to support the claim that contractors often submit unrealistically low tenders, in the 
hope of winning the bid and finding ways of recouping this loss through the mechanisms of change-
orders and claims (Rooke et al., 2004; Coggins et al. 2016; Love et al. 2017). Chaovalitwongse et al. 
(2012) noted that “many bidders (construction companies) tend to submit bids that are likely to be lower 
than the actual project costs to survive and win the bidding.” In the same vein, Gerber and Ong (2013, 
p. 22) observed that in extreme cases “…contractors are motivated to win a tender by submitting an 
abnormally low bid notwithstanding any inherent complexities the project may face.” Coggins et al. 
(2016) also noted: 
 
“…it is not uncommon for building contractors to adopt a marginal cost pricing strategy – 
where firms tender to cover the cost of labour, materials and plant (variable costs) to 
construct the contract works and whatever contribution they can obtain towards covering 
fixed costs such as head office overheads and returns/profits to the business owners – in an 
attempt to keep the business running in the short term…” (p. 44) 
 
Coggins et al. (2016) further observed that this type of underbidding leads to the prevalence of tight, or 
even zero, profit margins in the construction industry. It would seem that a perverse form of the 
‘winner’s curse’ comes into play1 as the industry is structured in a way that encourages and perpetuates 
such organisational behaviour. 
 
This competitive tendering process means that there is little room for error within bids (Morton & Ross, 
2007) and Lingard & Rowlinson (2005) explained that this can discourage contractors from factoring 
in the cost of performing the work safely. While alternative performance-based procurement systems, 
such as the ‘best-value’ method exist, the lowest-bid remains the most prominent procurement method 
and as there is a need to reduce costs in order to win projects, there are few incentives for the contractors 
to pay attention to site safety (Guo et al., 2015). When there is a low bid, this usually means a lower 
profit margin, and so safety can be the first area of saving when budgets become stretched during project 
delivery (Guo et al. 2015).  Unpaid  costs for construction equipment, machinery, materials and labour 
to complete the job would rapidly become evident on the project, as they would be physically missing. 
However for safety, the physical value can be difficult to visualise, especially as contractors are often 
                                               
1 Capen et al. (1971) observed that in traditional competitive auctions, “the winner tends to be the player who most 
overestimates true tract value (p. 643). This is somewhat reversed in competitive tendering in construction where 
the winner tends to be the lowest price bidder (Coggins et al. 2016; Gerber & Ong 2013).  
able to avoid a serious accident without significant investment, and hence it is perhaps not unsurprising 
that safety budgets within bids are often put under pressure during difficult financial times. Guo et al. 
(2015) found the average incident rate in one project was much lower than another because of the 
positive effects of ‘best-value’ bidding method on both safety budget and the level of safety efforts. 
This value should include occupational safety performance, not least because poor safety performance 
reflects badly upon construction clients (Lingard & Rowlinson, 2005). Yet while safety is often labelled 
as a value priority across construction sites; in order to gain business acceptance, there may need to be 
a levelling of site safety costs for competitive reasons (Finkel, 2015), arguably exacerbated by the 
industry structure as a whole.  
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), and its associated “lens of doing and being in business”, may offer 
a useful insight into understanding the dynamics between competitive tendering with price as the key 
differentiator, and safety performance during construction project delivery. Traced to Coase (1937) and 
popularised by Williamson (1985; 1988), TCE is concerned with the economics of being in and getting 
into business by “examining the comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task 
completion under alternative governance structures”(Williamson 1985, p. 2). Transactional costs are 
expenses incurred to provide goods or services. TCE thus helps to explain how complex contractual 
relationships must be governed to reduce cost and to create and maximise transaction value (Ketokivi 
& Mahoney 2017). TCE thus provides a prism for understanding which organizational responses offer 
the least-cost solution to govern a given transaction, otherwise referred to as discriminating alignment 
(Williamson (1985). Importantly, it helps to understand economic actors’ behavioural assumptions 
(opportunism and bounded rationality) as well as transaction characteristics in an environment of 
uncertainty, complexity, and market structure (Williamson 1985; Williamson 2010). 
 
Thus, Williamson (1985) asserts that all things being equal, firms will adopt the most cost-effective 
strategy, even if it may seem opportunistic and unethical in some cases. This may partly explain why 
clients mostly use competitive tendering to engage contractors – it helps them drive down the price for 
which the contract is awarded, and in some cases, incentivise the supply chain to innovate in driving 
best value. On the other hand, a logical extension of the TCE theory is that contractors will pursue cost 
efficiency as far as practicable once they get the contract, in an attempt to maximise revenue and profit. 
This commercial driver is accentuated if contractors won the contract on tight, near-zero profit margins 
because of downward pushing pressures of competitive tendering. This has been identified as precursor 
for adversarial, variation-seeking behaviours (Ioannou & Awwad 2010), the frequent insolvency of 




3.0 Research Methodology and Design 
 
Construction safety research sits within socio-technical interactions, with multiple stakeholders, 
including clients, designers, construction managers, workers, unions, employer groups and regulators 
all playing a key role in influencing workers’ safety in construction projects. In order to understand the 
human and social factors involved in construction safety, effective research requires the proper 
application of social science methods (Abowitz & O’Toole, 2010). In a recent analysis of construction 
safety research methods that drew on five highly ranked international journals and one international 
conference proceedings, Zou et al. (2014) concluded that there may be a gap between the direction taken 
by researchers and the practical needs of the construction industry with relation to improved 
understandings of safety. Costs are numerical and therefore it is no surprise that there has been a large 
body of work rooted in positivist traditions exploring the relationships between occupational H&S costs 
and accidents. However, Oswald et al. (2018a) argued there was a need to supplement such positivist 
approaches with alternative research methods, highlighting that a reliance on positivism will inevitably 
limit construction safety knowledge. Consequently, this research adopted an ethnographic approach to 
explore the implications and manifestations of limited accident prevention costs in practice. 
 
Ethnography is the recording and analysis of a culture or society, typically based on participant-
observation (as was the case here) and results in a written account of a people, place or institution 
(Coleman & Simpson, 1998). In this study, the emergent ethnographic data revealed insights into unsafe 
working practices that appeared to be closely associated with the financial constraints in place on the 
project. This was explored through use of moderate participant observation, which involved the 
researcher:  
 observing a wide range of on-site activities;  
 participating in organised site walks, and informal site walkarounds;  
 attending site and H&S department meetings;  
 informal discussions with senior managers, site managers, H&S advisors and site operatives.  
 
The case study project was a multinational joint venture that had been created between four 
organizations, and their successful tender bid was approximately £250m less than the next nearest 
competitor. There were over 1000 construction trade workers on the site at peak, including steel-fixers, 
crane operators, scaffolders, carpenters, and welders. The researcher became a member of the project’s 
H&S department and spent over 1500 hours at the research setting, making over 200 field records and 
collecting 150 units of documentary data. An overt research approach was adopted, where the researcher 
openly explained H&S was the topic of the investigation. Initial fieldnotes were captured according to 
their suitability within the social setting, which included typing notes into the researcher’s mobile phone 
when on-site; direct input into a laptop when in the office; or hand-written notes on minutes when in 
meetings. The researcher was viewed by the construction workers as having a ‘trainee-like’ role, where 
the underlying assumption was that he was aiming to gain employment as a H&S advisor in the future. 
This role created a social expectation for the researcher to ask many questions, which was helpful to 
unpack the actualities of the construction practices relating to safety. The data were analysed through a 
thematic approach, which identifies patterns across datasets relevant to addressing the research aims 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). The thematic approach consists of six stages: familiarisation with data, 
generating initial codes, searching for common themes, reviewing them, defining and naming themes 
and producing a final report (ibid).  Analysis of the ethnographic data resulted in the emergence of 
various prominent themes throughout the fieldwork period of this case study research project, a key one 
being the implications of cost-saving strategies on safety risks. 
 
As a methodological note, expletives have been blanked out with * symbols, but have remained within 
the quotations to ensure authenticity. The results are presented in the following section, as associated 
with the different aspects of cost-savings and accident prevention costs that emerged from analysis of 
the data.  Where quotes and vignettes are provided, these are simply representational of the wider data 
as a whole, and are included to help illustrate the findings and enhance understandings of possible 





It was widely acknowledged on the project that cost-cutting strategies were required to stay within the 
tight budget that had initially won the project for the consortium. For example, one site manager stated: 
 
‘They [temporary staircases] are clearly cheap, but does it surprise you? Across the board everything’s 
cheap… cheap tools, cheap equipment, cheap labour… add s**t with s**t, you don't get roses... My 
biggest concern is we are lacking experience. This is a massive project, we need guys with experience. 
I really hope that nobody gets seriously hurt, because I wouldn't wish that on my worst enemy.' 
 
Cost-cutting strategies were identifiable in the resourcing of materials, tools, equipment and labour (e.g.  
cheaper, inexperienced workers). These strategies reduced costs but increased safety risks. 
 
4.1 Compulsory costs 
 
4.1.1 Temporary works, structures and facilities 
 
The following fieldnote demonstrates how temporary structures, such as internal access staircases, had 
been purchased as they were low-cost. Yet, they were of poor quality in the sense that objects were able 
to fall through gaps within the staircase structures:  
 
Climbing the internal staircase you could hear drilling, hammering and the odd shout from a 
construction worker echoing down from near the top of the staircase. It was dusty and there were small 
chunks of concrete scattered all across the stairwell and the landings. On one staircase the H&S advisor 
noticed that there were gaps, which meant that tools or materials could fall through. He turned and 
said to me: 'you get what you pay for... it is not best practice, it is just a cheap design… if you were any 
skinnier you might slip through!'.  The steel staircases had been recently constructed following extensive 
checks, as they had arrived lighter than expected, which initially suggested missing components. 
 
Structures that were temporary were given less value on the project, and legal compliance became the 
only objective, rather than going beyond this minimum requirement. On the site safety walks, it became 
clear that spending money on temporary structures was resisted, as highlighted by the fieldnote below: 
 
I observed a missing gate at the top of a ladder to the scaffold.  Mentioning this to the H&S advisor, he 
explained ‘I know, Jim [scaffolder supervisor] says they aren’t buying gates any more. They say that 
‘you cannot put a price on safety’ but it will be a battle to get a gate... We will get one though.’ 
 
Temporary facilities available to the workers were also affected by a cost-saving approach: 
 
H&S advisor: ‘The site had the bare minimum to get the guys working. It was set up with no running 
water, no chairs, soap, hand towels – we were lucky the unit had four walls. I spoke to the Head of 
Section and Foreman and they got it sorted. But we are still having issues. The cleaner hasn’t been out 
in a month and the guys are living like rats. Welfare units looking like pig stys - no-one seems 
responsible for it… the workers are complaining there were ‘too many men, not enough facilities’.  
 
Elbeltagi et al. (2004) recommended that the size and number of these facilities should not only reflect 
the site size, nature of the work, and the number of people who will use them, but also consider the type 
of work being carried out. For example, if many workers are undertaking substructure works which can 





4.1.2 Basic personal protective equipment (PPE) 
 
Basic PPE includes the standard mandatory items on construction sites, which for this site was: hard 
hats, high-viz clothing, safety boots, gloves and light eye protection glasses. Other additional PPE is 
required by workers as dictated by the risk assessments undertaken for specific work processed as 
required by the UK’s Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. 
 
I observed two H&S advisors’ discussing another incident that related to poor quality of protective 
equipment in the H&S office. On this occasion an operative had set fire to himself, leading to the 
following discussion: 
 
H&S advisor 1 (after fire incident): ‘Do they know that it is fire resistant not fire proof?!’. 
 
H&S advisor 2: ‘He must have worked like this, (kneeling down acting out the operatives work motion) 
for the jacket to have those burns. It is a riskier stance to what he should take, but he shouldn’t have 
caught fire. It is cheap protective clothing.’ 
 
H&S advisor 1: ‘Yes, they are poor quality.’ 
 
During this fire incident, the H&S advisors concluded that risk-taking behaviour had occurred, and this 
could have been a consequence of risk homeostasis theory (see Wilde, 1998). This theory argues that 
individuals will adjust their behaviour in response to the perceived level of risk. The H&S advisors 
recognised the worker had adopted a riskier stance than normal after being provided when fire-resistant 
overalls, which created a (false) sense of reduced risk with regard to fire safety. There were several 
recorded incidents of the fire-resistant overalls catching fire, which in turn raised suspicions around 
their quality. Other protective equipment also raised concerns, including safety glasses and boots. For 
example, workers required multiple pairs of glasses, as they were very easily scratched within the site 
environment, as well as complaints of sore feet due to the safety boot quality. The perceived poor-
quality safety boots were often linked to a higher than expected number of foot and ankle injuries: 
 
H&S advisor: ‘They are s**t quality. I think they are a factor as to why we have had so many  
ankle injuries. They offer a lack of protection. Barely cover the ankle. If they were another  
2-3 inches higher, that would give more protection.’ 
 
Olson et al., (2009) recommend that one way to encourage the use of PPE is to increase its availability 
but also its quality. High quality PPE can therefore not only increase usage, but also helps protect 
individuals against potential injury, however this does of course have associated costs. 
 
4.1.3 Tools, plant and machinery 
 
While H&S advisors raised concerns about some of the PPE, construction workers also raised 
complaints about the quality of their tools. For example, a discussion on this subject was raised as an 
item at a meeting with a H&S advisor and three worker safety representatives to discuss the results of 
a safety climate survey. The researcher sat in the meeting and observed the following discussion: 
 
Operative 1: 'have you got any questions in there about tools… ‘cause the tools we get are obviously 
bought ‘cause they are cheap. They are all the tool are in red tags. It becomes a problem if you have to 
finish a job, but you’re only allowed to use the tool for two hours'. 
Operative 2: ‘Yea (nodding), and those whacker plates [vibrating compacting plates], they should all 
be an electric start'. 
H&S advisor: ‘Agreed, I walked past one the other day and it looked older than me (50+)'. 
Operative 2: ‘They are lethal [the outdated hand-start feature], it kicks back at you like a f****r’ 
 
Tools with ‘red tags’ create high vibration when they are used, which can lead to worker health issues 
such as hand-arm vibration syndrome, a form of Raynaud syndrome.  They are usually cheaper than 
low-vibration tools and acceptable if managed correctly with time limits placed on worker use. 
However, this meant that the time spent using these tools had to be carefully calculated in order to 
manage the red tag tools safely, and generated restrictions and challenges when the project was under 
schedule pressure. The cheap whacker plates with outdated starters were described as ‘lethal’ by an 
operative, and H&S advisor had questioned their quality simply based on their appearance. Although 
the cheap tools could be simply attributed to reducing plant resourcing costs, according to Zeng et al. 
(2008) one of the main reasons for poor safety performance is low safety awareness amongst 
organisations, such as the potential implications of this plant resourcing decision on worker health and 
safety. 
 
4.1.4 Tool tethers 
 
A further fieldnote example that demonstrates the resistance to expensive safety ‘add-ons’ was the use 
of tool tethers: 
  
A recent first aid incident had occurred. An electrician had been hit on the shoulder by a falling 
hammer. The hammer was pushed out of a joiner's tool belt as he knelt down to fix gaps above with 
plywood (to stop falling objects). This incident was being discussed at a H&S meeting: 
 
H&S Advisor: ‘There is no doubt the area below should have been an exclusion zone… it was not in 
the ten-minute brief, and there was no signage. But the primary control measure should be to stop the 
drop. The tools should be tethered.’ 
 
H&S Manager: ‘It has been raised upstairs [senior management]. There were some concerns with the 
user-friendliness of the tethers, we need the guys to want to use them. That and when the pricing came 
out for tethering tools, it was met with a frosty reception. Cost, cost, cost, programme, programme, 
programme. But we have them now.’ 
 
Workers explained that the tethers were not typically used and many simply did not want their own 
tools permanently tethered. The tools became impractical when the motion of the tool when tethered 
(e.g. twisting) made it difficult to complete the task. One operative stated: 
 
‘We are the guys having to use the tethers, but we weren’t consulted. They just buy a bunch and expect 
us to use them when they might not work for all of us. We have scaffs, joiners, welders, all doing different 
work.’ 
 
The workers believed the tethers were not practical for all work tasks, trades or scenarios. The provision 
of tethers could therefore be seen as a wasted cost, as workers were not using the expensive protective 
equipment, however it did put the superiors at ease, at least from a legal perspective:  
  
H&S advisor: ‘The ironic thing is they may have cost a whack [a lot], and may be our best item of PPE, 
but they are sitting in the foreman’s offices. The guys don’t wear them. It is so we [principal contractor] 
can say, look, we have told the guys to wear them, its in the RAMS [Risk Assessment and Method 
Statement], we have them sitting there, if you don’t wear them it’s not our fault. Protecting ourselves, 
but what’s it doing for safety, we have spent a load of money on tethers that are just sitting in a box. 
They don’t come cheap either.’ 
 
Paap (2003) proposed that in the construction industry safety should be interpreted in two forms: the 
official procedures and the actual working operations - a distinction between the rules stated and the 
rules that actually govern the workplace. This double-provision was described by Paap (2003:221) as 
‘a bait-and-switch, since it clearly serves to advantage the employers at the expense of the workers’. In 
an attempt to avoid this mismatch between rules and practice, contemporary thinking has led to 
workforce engagement, where workers are instead consulted about their safety (Sherratt, 2011) and how 
management provisions can actually optimise their safety on site.  
 
 
4.1.5 Labour consultation 
 
In the UK, there are Regulations for the provision of H&S committees and worker representatives.  The 
HSE (n.d.) state that ‘if two or more union-appointed health and safety representatives request in writing 
that you set up a H&S committee, you must do so within three months of the request.’ Therefore, the 
time and resources required to set up and run these committees can be considered a compulsory safety 
cost. A H&S committee had been established on the project, yet faced challenges as work supervisors 
highlighted: 
 
‘The guys [site-based workers] never knew about it; managers don’t say to go, to avoid losing guys 
[workers]. The Project Director wants more of the workforce there, but guys in the workforce ‘can’t 
say anything’ in-front of their bosses or head of sections.’ 
 
The committee was created and thus required the investment of resources, but consultation was still a 
challenge as it was not well-communicated; supervisors were under high production pressure so did not 
want their own workers to spend time at the meeting; and in the meetings the hierarchal power relations 
present meant that H&S insights from the front-line were not always shared openly or willingly. Cheng 
et al. (2012) stressed that the construction industry has paid relatively less attention to safety 
management committees, which they found to have a strong positive perceived impact on project 
performance.  Without associated support and action, labour consultation on the project was an 
ineffective spend of compulsory costs and therefore did not derive the potential benefits from this 
investment. 
 
4.1.5 Labour understaffing 
  
The H&S advisors acknowledged that the project labour resources were ‘very thin on the ground’, 
particularly with scaffolders: 
 
‘we are already light, especially on a Monday due to rotations…scaffolders are a rare breed on this 
project… and two more have just left…it is like a fiddle string out there, just getting tighter and tighter' 
 
From a safety perspective, one of the scaffolder’s duties was to inspect and ‘sign-off’ a scafftag, a 
physical sign that indicates temporary scaffold structures are safe for worker use. The lack of scaffolders 
on the project made this simple task for a competent scaffolder more challenging simply due to volume 
of work and the pressure to complete it quickly. Some scaffolders had left the project as the wage they 
were receiving was lower than they could secure on another site. This suggests that paying low salaries 
to try and save costs can create safety risks; since, for example, there could be no qualified scaffolders 
present to determine whether access platforms were actually safe to use by others. Access platforms 
that had not been ‘signed off’ by scaffolders are still used by other trade operatives under production 
pressures to complete their work, creating an inherent safety risk should they be incorrectly constructed.  
This finding reveals a more nuanced safety risk consequence of paying low wages and consequential 
understaffing as found on this project, with regards to a specific and safety-critical trade. 
 
Safety observation reports highlighted this lack of resources, across a variety of roles, as an unsafe 
condition on the site. For example, one report stated: ‘Lack of banksmen at formwork assembly yard’. 
Rowlinson and Yunyan (2015:187) stated there were ‘shortages of labour in an overloaded industry’; 
and from a review of the literature Ho (2016) identified that these labour or skill shortages in 
construction have occurred in many countries. Where there are shortages, migrant workers have been 
an important resource (Fellini et al., 2007). Shortages can suggest that there is a lack of skilled trades, 
or management expertise available. However, the research participants believed that there was also a 
cost-saving action being undertaken, by understaffing some site areas. This was not perceived as 
unusual on this project, as the need to keep to a tight budget was driven by the initial project bid, and a 
straightforward way to reduce costs was through fewer and lower wages.  
 
4.1.6 Labour: Migrant workers  
 
As well as filling potential labour gaps, migrant workers served other benefits, as they were typically 
hard-working, obedient and cost less to employ than local workers. One project civil engineer put it as:  
 
'They are hungry, will work all the hours, will do as they are told, and are cheap' 
 
Fellini et al. (2007) reported that construction companies regularly recruit foreign workers to reduce 
labour costs, through the use of informal and sometimes illegal strategies. As the bargaining power of 
foreign workers is typically weaker than that of a domestic worker, immigrants often accept lower pay 
(Fellini et al., 2007). While, migrant workers may have cost less in terms of salary; they pose additional 
challenges and risks in terms of H&S management, as the H&S manager explained: 
 
‘The bean counters just see the bottom line [initial cost]. Our migrant workers have been employed 
because they are cheap. Then we are tasked to manage workers we struggle to communicate with, 
workers that are inexperienced and workers that are not used to the UK standards and ways of working. 
We need resources for that.’  
 
Migrant workers should not be disadvantaged in terms of safety; but statistics suggest they are at greater 
risk than local workers (see, for example, Byler, 2013; CCA, 2009; Meardi, 2012). One example of 
migrant workers being disadvantaged in terms of safety was reported by Trajkovski & Loosemore 
(2006), when a construction site manager faced with a labour shortage fraudulently completed the safety 
induction assessments for his migrant workers, thereby cheating the safety management system but 
enabling them to commence work on the site. Bust et al. (2008) recommended a new approach was 
needed for the safety management of migrant workers; and Oswald et al. (2019) revealed that cost-
neutral multinational communication strategies were limited and needed more careful consideration.  
 
 
4.2 Voluntary costs 
 
The project did invest in some voluntary safety costs by collecting proactive safety data through 
additional inspections and providing behavioural-based safety training. Cross Department Workplace 
Inspections were to be carried out as a proactive safety activity. However, in the H&S meetings there 
were serious fears 'it will turn into a war'. In these meetings, H&S advisors were encouraged to 'act as 
a referee' and ensure that the data that was gathered was agreed on by both parties. The workplace 
inspections were not the only voluntary safety activity that risked being unhelpful, with the observation 
system being described by workers as ‘unproductive and creates backstabbing behaviour’ . One worker 
suggested the system needed alterations: 
 
‘Re-launch the system, with a strong lead given that it must not be used to avoid intervening at the time 
or as a means of firing bullets at others, or simply to moan about low-level rubbish! In the short term 
this may lead to a significant fall in the number of SORs [safety observation reports] submitted.’ 
 
Observations were recorded with an emphasis on ‘closing out’ any issues identified. Over 6000 safety 
observations were captured, with some having already been ‘closed out’ by the time they were 
documented, and others remaining unresolved. The administration of this system was both a timely 
and costly exercise, due to the number of safety observations, many of which were, as the H&S 
advisors repeatedly stated, ‘not worth the paper they were written on’. Proactive leading indicators 
have been recommended for use within construction safety management (see, for example, Hinze, 
2013; Hallowell, 2013), yet implementation alone does not guarantee improved safety performance, 
and there are problems can arise that are actually damaging for project safety performance (Oswald et 
al., 2018b).  Safety climate is typically considered a leading indicator (Votano et al., 2014); although 
it can also be considered lagging if analysed alongside accident or incident rates. At the beginning of 
the case study project, a consultant was employed to undertake a survey and analyse the safety climate 
of the project every few months. Yet, as project costs became tighter as the construction stages 
progressed, this cost was easily and swiftly removed by cancelling the contract and ceasing work with 
the consultant, thus any benefit for enhanced safety management derived from this financial 
investment was also curtailed.  
 
The project adopted a behavioural-based safety (BBS) approach, which was an overarching umbrella 
term used to cover the safety observation system and supplemental BBS training that was undertaken. 
However, the approach put in place did not involve calculating a site-safety observation score, nor did 
it involve a feedback loop that is present in other behavioural programmes, and the BBS training was 
aimed solely at supervisors. In one H&S meeting, the H&S Manager explained one of the purposes of 
the training: 
 
'One of the things these BBS sessions are going to try and address is what supervisors need to do with 
respect to safety. Supervisors have been more focused on paperwork, they need to be more focused on 
the goings on, and supervise the work. They need to be more supervisor driven than paper driven.' 
 
This goal represented a positive move from the drawbacks associated with the bureaucracy of safety 
(see Dekker, 2014); yet the mandatory training sessions were very poorly attended by supervisors. In 
one session, only two out of twenty invited supervisors attended, with the consultant admitting to the 
researcher that it was ‘a waste of money’. The lack of attendance could reflect Wilkins (2011) work, 
which found that the construction workforce is generally dissatisfied with training effectiveness. On the 
case study project, simply hiring a consultant and organising training sessions did not represent accident 
prevention costs well spent. The sessions were not attended partly due to the significant production 
pressure at the frontline, where supervisors play a crucial role. In the face of programme pressures and 
small profit margins, subcontractors are often squeezed so tight that investment in training and 
development activities are restricted, even in major organisations (Loosemore et al., 2003) and on 
sizeable projects such as this.  
 
In addition, the behavioural safety initiatives were not widely accepted by the construction project as 
an effective strategy. Behavioural safety was often referred to as ‘a big group hug’ by the workforce; 
which in a macho and masculine industry such as construction, can be a significant barrier to 
effectiveness (see, for example, Anderson, 2005; Cox & Jones, 2006), with experimental results having 
mixed fortunes in the construction industry (Lingard & Rowlinson, 1997). Even the H&S advisors, who 
arguably should be champions of all the safety initiatives on the project were divided with BBS. Within 
the team of eight there were some that supported the implementation of the programme, while others 
saw behavioural safety as ‘a buzz word’ and ‘an excuse for consultants to charge a lot of money’. There 
also was a lack of clear understanding as to what the behavioural safety programme should entail, with 
one H&S advisor who undertook the training, stating: 
 
‘I wasn’t sure what behavioural safety was, but after the training I realised I’m already doing 
behavioural safety’ 
 
The supervisor training revolved around successful safety interventions when workers were undertaking 
unsafe behaviours. The lack of understanding of BBS, the inherent production pressures on the project, 






Safety is one of the performance delivery requirements for a ‘successful’ construction project, alongside 
time, cost and quality (Han et al., 2014). Safety should therefore not be isolated from these other project 
elements, and instead be considered an integral component of any construction project (Hinze, 1997). 
Safety costs can also be expressed through the benefits of production, since productive capabilities are 
enhanced as workers are not interrupted with accidents and injuries (Finkel, 2015). The HSE (2015) 
estimates that the total cost of work-related injury for the 2013–14 financial year in the UK was £14.3 
billion. Hence, accidents create significant economic and social costs, and it is vitally important for 
improvements to occur in safety performance and business outcomes in the high risk and economically 
significant construction sector. 
 
However, the current industry structure encourages winning tenders using sub-optimal bids, as was the 
case on this case study project. This created an environment and project culture which generally sets 
the commercial drivers that define the strategic goals of clients and contractors on a collision course. 
Clients pursue value-for-money and a product with the requisite functionality. Ultimately, clients seek 
a product at the lowest cost with the highest quality. Contractors, on the other hand, aim to increase 
their revenue and maximise profit. Ideally, they would prefer not to significantly exceed the agreed 
minimum specifications of compliance in the contract, especially if it reduces their profitability. It is 
thus not illogical to claim that contractors may sometimes trade-off quality and effective safety 
provision in an attempt to get the job done quickly or at lowest expense possible. This is consistent with 
the principle of discriminating alignment in transactional cost economics – i.e. in an attempt to reduce 
cost and maximise profits, organisations would often chose the least-cost solution to govern any given 
transaction (Williamson 1985). The value of transactional costs can be significant for contractors. 
Analysing six case studies, Whittington (2008) found that pre-construction transaction costs in design-
bid-build and design/bid projects range from 0.4-8.8% and 0-5.7% of total contract value, respectively. 
The post-contract transactional costs in Whittington (2008) can be as high as 14.7% of contract value 
in design-bid-build projects and averaged 9.5% in design-build projects. 
 
Thus, there is little tangible incentive for contractors to go beyond the minimum compliance 
requirements of safety regulations given the current industry structure. According to Ratay (1997), good 
codes and standards can improve construction safety at minimal or no extra cost. However, poor codes 
and standards can contribute to disputes and increased costs with little or no effect on construction 
safety. The findings from this case study project revealed that while the codes and standards in the UK 
can be perceived as advanced, they were still subject to misapplication. For example, tool tethers would 
be purchased in an attempt to avoid dropped tools and meet legislative requirements; yet workers were 
not involved in the decision-making process for selection of the type of tool tethers which were felt to 
be unworkable and would therefore not typically wear them. Also, the safety steel toe-capped boots that 
were purchased to meet legal requirements were poor quality and were considered a contributing factor 
in ankle injuries that occurred on the site, the cost saving here creating new safety hazards in practice.  
 
This work makes a valuable contribution by revealing how those at the frontline on this case-study 
project acknowledged that compulsory accident prevention costs were typically for legal compliance, 
but also cheap, and low quality, which suggested minimum safety standards were acceptable. Yet 
spending extra on basic safety equipment, to meet the workers’ needs, and improve the quality, not only 
has the potential to reduce safety risks, but sends a message to the workforce that safety is an important 
value. The opposite message is conveyed when companies purchase poor quality safety equipment; or 
equipment that is not appropriate (such as tool tethers for steel fixers that do not allow for twisting 
motions) for the workers is purchased without their consultation. The industry structure and 
consequential high competition, generally low-profit margins and low barriers of entry found in the 
construction industry arguably discourage contractors from factoring in appropriate costs to provide the 
plant and material resources to perform the work safely. Although safety is often described by project 
managers as the number one priority, the findings from this case study project found cost to be a major 
influence on the management of safety in practice in a number of different ways. 
 
Labour resourcing, in the form of understaffing and employing inexperienced personnel on this 
construction project could also be interpreted as a deliberate cost-saving approach, rather than an 
unfortunate outcome of labour shortages. The lack of qualified and experienced personnel on the project 
was of concern to the H&S team. In previous ethnographic studies, Aboagye-Nimo et al., (2015) 
explained that experienced workers can pass local knowledge to less experienced workers through on-
site training; and Baarts (2009) revealed that experts and experienced construction workers have 
practised and observed for long enough to know about different situations, and therefore can anticipate 
and thus manage looming dangers on site. On this project, there were safety-related challenges when 
there were insufficient numbers of a particular trade or trained personnel for a task; such the lack of 
scaffolders being able to competently assess if the temporary structures were safe. A motivator for the 
scaffolders to leave was that they could receive a higher wage elsewhere on another project. Hence, 
negotiating low wages to save costs created problems when employees later left for higher wages. These 
employees would have to be replaced – a process not without its own direct cost – while in the meantime 
their absence created safety issues. 
 
Migrant workers have been an important resource in construction for filling labour gaps, but there were 
suggestions in this study that they were also employed because they were lower cost than the local 
workers. Fellini et al. (2007) reported that construction companies recruit foreign workers to reduce 
labour costs, often through the use of informal and sometimes illegal strategies. As the bargaining power 
of foreign workers is typically weaker than that of domestic workers, they are more likely to accept 
lower pay (Fellini et al., 2007). While migrant workers may have cost less in terms of salary this is 
something of a false economy as they can pose additional challenges and risks in terms of safety 
management. Additional risks are associated with communication barriers and cultural differences need 
to be properly assessed with the development of more sophisticated safety management systems 
(Oswald et al., 2019), which are likely to incur additional costs, such as professional translators. 
 
Forward-thinking companies desire to go beyond legislative compliance, and invest in voluntary 
accident prevention costs. This can include behaviour-based safety (Li et al., 2015), culture and 
behaviour change approaches (Dejoy, 2005), training (Demirkesen & Arditi, 2015) and the collection 
of proactive leading indicators (Hallowell et al., 2013), as well as the fundamental lagging indicators 
typically required by law. However, many workers on the case study project did not believe the 
behavioural approaches implemented were effective; which is arguably understandable considering 
over the past twenty years in the UK there has been a lack of evidence of their success (Sherratt & 
Farrell, 2011). This lack of belief acted as a commitment barrier to the approach, and created a 





Accident prevention costs have found to be a worthwhile investment by previous quantitative studies. 
However, it is not well understood how these costs are best used in an industry which is traditionally 
structured to operate within very tight margins.  As industry clients and contractors alike continue to 
award contracts on a lowest-cost basis, rather than best value, the negative implications for safety risks 
on projects must continue to be highlighted. Projects on very tight profit margins from the outset 
arguably have to take extra risks in their safety management in order to stay on schedule and under 
budget. These extra risks are linked to resourcing in the form of hiring inexperienced and cheaper 
labour, reducing staff, and the use of poor-quality personnel protective equipment, tools and temporary 
structures. 
 
The prevention costs for safety need to be more carefully considered. The evidence in this study 
suggests that choosing an initial low-cost option for safety equipment and resources, may not actually 
be the cheapest, nor the best for safety. For instance, cheaper inexperienced or migrant workers, will 
require to be more closely managed with regard to safety, which will represent an extra cost. Also, 
cheaper forms of PPE, are likely to be poorer quality, contribute to more accidents, and have to be 
replaced more frequently. The approach of choosing the lowest-cost options to achieve minimum 
standards also sends a message to the workforce that safety is not prioritised over cost. This is often the 
opposite of company rhetoric that aims to demonstrate safety is the priority.  
 
Construction companies are arguably operating within an industry structure that only allows for the 
lowest-cost option to be chosen, as the winner of the tender almost always tends to be the cheapest bid. 
Hence, before any construction work has begun, the budgets are tight, and the cost of doing the work 
in an unsafe manner is likely to have to be risked on occasions throughout the project. It could be 
reasoned that more responsibility should to lie with the client, by ensuring the best-value bid is selected, 
rather than the cheapest. Perhaps, government clients, seeking to represent ‘model client behaviour’, 
should consider this more highly, as one of their fundamental duties for setting their projects up for 
success.  A call is made here for clients to assess for best-value, researchers to help assist clients in how 
best-value can determined, and for construction companies to tender for not only the cost of the work, 
but for also completing it safely. Hence, further research is encouraged to identify through robust 
methods how the industry structure should change. For example, studies could explore how best-value 
can be determined, how regulation could help, or how pre-qualification tender criteria could be 
improved to further focus on safety. As until the whole industry structure changes, it will continue to 
be structured for failure, where the lowest bids will continue prevail, and safety risks and accidents will 
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